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University of Edinburgh 
 
Why Can’t a Pastor Be President of a “Christian Nation?”: 
Pentecostal Politics as Religious Mediation 
 
Why has Nevers Mumba, one of Zambia’s most famous Pentecostal leaders, been so 
unsuccessful in his various presidential bids? Previous analyses have blamed Mumba’s 
political woes on a presumed Pentecostal belief that politics is a lesser vocation than the 
pastorate. In contrast to these interpretations, I argue that Pentecostals in Zambia are 
very committed to the notion that, at least ideally, their leaders should be pastors, and 
more specifically that they should be effective mediators of the divine covenant 
established when Zambia was declared a “Christian nation.” The problem with Nevers 
Mumba is therefore not that pastors aren’t supposed to be politicians, but rather that he 
has failed to convince believers that he is a good mediator. This paper opens up new 
horizons in the study of Pentecostal politics, suggesting that populism in countries with 
high Pentecostal populations is increasingly defined by the capacity for religious 
mediation.  
 
[Pentecostal Christianity, political theology, populism, Zambia, electoral politics] 
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On 28 October 2014, just four days after his country celebrated fifty years of 
independence, Zambian president Michael Sata died in London, where he was seeking 
medical attention for an undisclosed illness. Under Zambian law the death of a sitting 
president requires new presidential elections to take place within 90 days, and a special 
poll was organized for 20 January 2015. One of the candidates in this election was 
Nevers Mumba, president of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the party 
that had controlled the Zambian government from the end of one-party rule in 1991 until 
Sata’s election in 2011. Despite the fact that some analysts predicted that the MMD 
might have a chance to return to power after Sata’s death (Dionne and Mulikita 2015, 
131), Mumba polled just 0.9% of the vote - a worse outcome by far than any MMD 
presidential candidate had experienced before. The 2015 special election was not 
Mumba’s first bid for the Zambian presidency. In 2001 he ran for the office on the ticket 
of a party he founded, the National Citizens Coalition (NCC). That election went only 
marginally better for Mumba, who came away with just over two per cent of the vote. 
 
Nevers Mumba’s failure to perform well in Zambian elections is surprising. By the time 
of his first presidential bid Mumba had already made a name for himself as a Pentecostal 
pastor. Mumba was Zambia’s first televangelist and the founder of the country’s first 
mega-church, Victory Ministries. As in many African countries, Pentecostal adherence in 
Zambia has increased exponentially in the last thirty years, and Mumba’s career has 
developed alongside a significant Pentecostal revival. Today, the vast majority of the 
roughly 13 million Zambians are Christians (95.5% according to the 2010 census), and 
more than 3.8 million of these fit into the broad category that I refer to as Pentecostal 
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believers (Johnson and Zurlo 2014).1 This means that roughly 28 per cent of Zambians 
are Pentecostals. In fact, these figures do not reveal the full extent of Pentecostalism’s 
influence. In the years I have spent studying Pentecostals in Zambia’s Copperbelt 
province, I have found that a significant number of people who do not describe 
themselves as “ba Pente,” (Pentecostals) nevertheless attend Pentecostal gatherings on a 
regular basis, especially the very popular interdenominational prayer meetings that have 
become an important feature of the Zambian religious landscape in the past decade. And 
yet a Pentecostal pastor has not been able to garner more than a very small percentage of 
the popular vote in two separate bids for the Zambian presidency.   
 
Analysts have typically attributed Mumba’s lack of political support among Pentecostals 
to a perceived belief on the part of the latter that politics is a less worthy calling than the 
pastorate (e.g. Phiri 2003, 412-415). It is true that Pentecostals have routinely accused 
Mumba of abandoning the pulpit in favor of the podium, so to speak, and in so doing of 
abrogating his calling as a “man of God.” Sometimes, as I will show, they have used 
Mumba’s own words against him in these charges. In response, Mumba has consistently 
argued that he has not stopped being a pastor just because he has entered secular politics. 
Indeed, as he sees it, far from serving as a barrier to political involvement, his status as a 
pastor uniquely qualifies him for the Zambian presidency. While it is easy to see why the 
debate between Mumba and the Pentecostal public has been interpreted as evidence that 
believers regard politics and other “earthy” concerns as less important than the eternal 
work of Christian ministry, I want to argue that something else is going on in this 
exchange. Rather than serving as evidence that believers do not want pastors to get into 
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politics, a careful examination of the political theology behind the Pentecostal response to 
Mumba reveals that the reality is just the opposite. By “political theology” I am referring 
here to a distinctly Pentecostal “conceptualization of the ways in which power can and 
should be distributed, exercised, and legitimated” (Marshall 2014, S352). In the case of 
Zambia, the defining issue in national political theology is the role of government leaders 
in representing the country before God, an issue that clearly references Old Testament 
hierocracy (cf. Brueggemann 2003). Drawing on twenty-two months of fieldwork with 
Pentecostals on the Zambian Copperbelt, as well as readings in Pentecostal theology and 
online discussions of Zambian politics, I show that believers want their political leaders 
to be pastors, and more specifically that they want them to serve as religious 
intermediaries. The problem with Mumba, then, is not that he is a pastor, but rather that 
he is not an effective priest – that is, that he has not given Pentecostal voters evidence 
that he is capable of carrying out the kind of spiritual mediation that they want from their 
religious and political leaders.  
 
By examining the peculiar case of Nevers Mumba, my aim is to contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of Pentecostal politics, both in Zambia and in Africa more 
generally. Well there can be no doubt that Christianity, perhaps especially in its 
Pentecostal guise, is playing an increasingly important role in political life across the 
continent (e.g. Obadare 2006, Bompani 2016, Deacon 2015), there has been considerable 
social scientific debate over exactly what this entails. The underlying question in these 
discussions is essentially whether politics or religion serves as the grounding framework 
in Christian political action. Are people compelled by religion because it allows them to 
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make political claims, or do they make certain political claims because they are religious? 
Neither side of this debate offers an entirely satisfying answer. Analyses that foreground 
the role of religion in African political thought, for example those put forward by Stephen 
Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar (1998, 2004), have been accused of reproducing essentialist 
discourses in which Africans were portrayed is overly spiritual (Green 2006). Meanwhile, 
discussions that foreground political economy as the driving force behind religious 
discourse, exemplified by the work of Jean and John Comaroff (1999, 2000; also see Jean 
Comaroff 2009), have been charged with a failure to take believers seriously – to 
recognize, in other words, that religion is not simply a “second-order process of 
adjustment” to the conditions of late capitalism, but is rather “a site of action, invested in 
and appropriated by believers” (Marshall 2009, 22; also see Haynes 2012, 2015; Englund 
2011).  
 
It is not difficult to see that arguments over the relative position of religion and politics, 
while important insofar as they have demonstrated the strong link between these 
domains, are ultimately rather unsatisfying. Writing about a similar set of debates in 
Oceania, Joel Robbins (2013) has highlighted a tendency toward what he calls analytical 
“scorekeeping,” measuring the value of particular churches against political categories 
like democratization. In contrast to this type of analysis, Robbins argues that 
anthropologists must “open ourselves to the unfamiliar aspects of Christian politics,” 
while at the same time looking for ways to “evaluate these politics on their own terms” 
(Robbins 2013, 209). Turning our attention back to Africa, Harri Englund (2011) has 
likewise called for an analytical move away from politics to what he calls “public 
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culture” as a means of foregrounding how Christian ideas or practices constitute, rather 
than merely respond to, the parameters of debate. Moving from politics to publics, he 
argues, allows us in turn to move beyond “sterile definitional disputes over the scope of 
the political and the religious” and toward “an investigation of what actually assumes 
public significance in the historically specific circumstances of religious and political 
contestation” (Englund 2011, 8). 
 
The political career of Nevers Mumba represents a productive space within which to 
engage “the unfamiliar aspects of Christian politics” by examining the elements of 
Pentecostal ritual life that have “[assumed] public significance” in Zambia in last twenty-
five years. Building on previous work in which I have shown that Pentecostal religious 
practices are central to political participation in Zambia (Haynes 2015), in the discussion 
that follows I explore the implications of this religious-political context for Pentecostal 
believers’ expectations of national leadership. To be a bit more specific, and drawing on 
established connections between Pentecostalism and patronage (McCauley 2013), 
political leadership in Zambia today is strongly identified with religious mediation. As I 
argue in the conclusion, this emphasis on mediation is increasingly shaping what counts 
as political populism in Zambia, and most likely in other countries with large Pentecostal 
populations as well. This claim represents a departure from previous discussions of 
Pentecostal politics in Africa by treating the religious actions of public figures not simply 
as efforts to win the approval of an increasingly Pentecostalized electorate (e.g. Gifford 
1998), but rather as representative of a new Pentecostal politics that expands the field of 
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political power beyond the state to include both demonic and divine entities (see Marshall 
2009, Meyer 2010, Haynes 2015). 
 
Since 2006 I have carried out twenty-two months of fieldwork with Pentecostals in the 
Copperbelt province of Zambia. Nearly all of that time has been spent in a neighborhood 
that I call Nsofu,2 a township with a population of approximately 25,000 people located 
on the outskirts of the city of Kitwe. While mainline congregations like the Roman 
Catholic Church or the United Church of Zambia are prominent features of the Nsofu 
religious landscape, the township is also home to more than one dozen Pentecostal 
churches and fellowships, and new Pentecostal groups are springing up all the time. All 
of these congregations are what could broadly be described as “neo-Pentecostal3,” as they 
eschew the asceticism of earlier forms of Pentecostalism and have instead adopted the 
principles of the prosperity gospel, a Christian movement that turns on the notion that it is 
God’s will for all believers to be rich, healthy, and successful (see Hunt 2000 for a 
survey).  
 
The underlying theological structures of the prosperity gospel have shaped the most 
significant Pentecostal political intervention in Zambia to date, namely the state-
sponsored declaration that the country is a “Christian nation” (see Haynes 2015, Cheyeka 
2008). “The declaration,” as it is often known, was initially made in 1991 by the 
Pentecostal President Frederick Chiluba, whose election marked the advent of multi-party 
democracy in Zambia (for discussions of the declaration, see Gifford 1998, Phiri 2003, 
Freston 2004, van Klinken 2013, 2014 Haynes 2015). Five years later it was enshrined in 
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the preamble to the Zambian constitution, effectively lending state approval to Chiluba’s 
Pentecostal brand of Christian nationalism (Yong 2010, 9-10). From the outset the 
declaration has been an overwhelmingly Pentecostal concern. Mainline churches were 
not consulted about the decision to make Zambia a Christian nation, and while some 
missionary-established denominations eventually came to support the declaration, other 
groups, most notably Catholics (representing some 35% of the population (Johnson and 
Zurlo 2014)), have been vocal in their opinion that it limits the critical capacity of the 
church, undermining the long history of Christian political opposition in Zambia 
(Hinfelaar 2011). While the declaration does not enjoy universal support among Zambian 
Christians, then, it is extremely important to how Pentecostals engage the state (Haynes 
2015). Although one might assume that Zambia’s unique form of Christian nationalism 
would work in favor of an aspiring politician like Nevers Mumba, a closer look at his 
career reveals that this has not been the case.  
 
A Pastor’s Bid for President4 
 
Nevers Mumba was among the first generation of Zambian young people to convert to 
Pentecostalism in the 1980s, and early on was marked out as a leader in his cohort. He 
got his start in Pentecostal ministry by serving as an interpreter for the German evangelist 
Reinhard Bonnke, whose “Africa Shall be Saved” crusades played a significant role in 
the spread of Pentecostalism across the continent. Bonnke took an interest in Mumba and 
arranged for him to attend Bible College at Christ for the Nations in Dallas, Texas from 
1982 to 1984. Upon returning to Zambia, Mumba founded Victory Ministries, which 
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quickly grew into one of the largest churches in Zambia. He set up a Bible school, 
pioneered the first evangelistic program on national television (“Zambia Shall Be 
Saved!”), and travelled widely, preaching throughout Zambia and overseas. During the 
1995 Victory Ministries International Conference in Lusaka, Mumba was given an 
honorary doctorate from the Full Gospel Christian Theological Seminary in Flint, 
Michigan, and as a result most Zambians refer to him as “Dr. Mumba.”  
  
Mumba’s prominence as a religious leader quickly lead to political influence as well, 
particularly after Chiluba’s election to the Zambian presidency on the MMD party ticket 
in 1991. Once he had made Zambia a Christian nation, Chiluba set about making political 
changes that would reflect the declaration. These included establishing diplomatic ties 
with Israel (like many conservative Protestants, Zambia’s Pentecostals are Zionists) and 
making it easier for people to register new churches and for missionaries to come into 
Zambia (Phiri 2003, 409). In addition, under Chiluba a few prominent pastors, including 
Mumba, were given diplomatic passports, as they were to be “ambassadors of the 
Christian nation” (Lockhart 2001, 65).  
 
While Mumba and Chiluba were close during the first years of Chiluba’s presidency, 
their relationship cooled after Chiluba began his second presidential term in 1996. There 
has been speculation that Mumba had designs on a post in Chiluba’s government, and 
that when he was not given one he began to distance himself from the president. Other 
accounts blame the tension between Mumba and Chiluba on the latter’s increasing 
corruption, which culminated in an attempt to change the constitution to allow Chiluba to 
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run for a third term in office. As Mumba’s friend and Bible school classmate Kirby 
Lockhart recalls, “Nevers found himself in a conundrum. He sincerely wanted to support 
his Christian brother [Chiluba], but was growing alarmed by the blatant and hypocritical 
partisanship of the MMD” (Lockhart 2001, 75). Mumba’s solution to this problem was to 
form the National Christian Coalition (NCC) in 1997, an organization similar to Jerry 
Falwell’s Moral Majority in the United States,5 which included among its goals 
“[Participating] in local and national elections with a view of infusing the system with 
God-fearing people” (qtd. in Lockhart 2001, 80). Mumba’s vision in the NCC was to 
transform Zambian politics – and by extension Zambia – by systematically replacing 
corrupt politicians with elected officials committed to Christian ethics. One year later, 
Mumba turned the NCC into a political party, renamed the National Citizen’s Coalition, 
and stood as its candidate in the 2001 presidential election. He fared poorly in this race, 
polling just 2.2 per cent of the vote (Rakner and Svåsand 2004, 52). Ultimately, Chiluba 
did not contest a third term, and his handpicked successor Levy Mwanawasa won the 
election easily for the MMD.  
 
Despite the fact that the 2001 election was dogged by allegations of fraud on the part of 
the MMD – allegations that Mumba supported6 – in 2003 Mumba dissolved the NCC and 
joined the ruling party. A few days after doing so he was appointed Zambia’s vice 
president under Mwanawasa. Mumba held this post for just sixteen months, at which 
point he was dismissed for making what President Mwanawasa called “embarrassing and 
careless” remarks during a press conference.7 In 2008 Mwanawasa died in office after 
suffering a stroke at an African Union summit in Cairo. The MMD nominated his vice 
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president Rupiah Banda to stand in the emergency elections that followed. Banda won, 
and Mumba found a home in the reconfigured MMD government as Zambia’s High 
Commissioner to Canada. This diplomatic post was revoked when the MMD was voted 
out of power and Sata assumed the presidency in 2011. Mumba returned to Zambia to 
contest the MMD party elections, which he won in a run-off to become the MMD party 
president. When Sata died in 2014 the MMD was divided over who would represent the 
party in Zambia’s second emergency presidential election in less than a decade. By the 
time Mumba finally emerged as the party nominee the campaign period had all but 
finished and public confidence in the MMD, historically one of independent Zambia’s 
three main political parties, was shattered. As noted in the introduction, Mumba received 
very little support – just 14,609 votes – which put him far behind the candidates for the 
ruling Patriotic Front and opposition UPND (United Party for National Development) 
parties.  
 
At the heart of Mumba’s poor performance, at least among Zambia’s Pentecostals, seems 
to be the question of why he left Christian ministry to enter politics in the first place. 
Here, an open letter to Mumba published on the Facebook page of the Zambian 
newspaper, The Post, provides a case in point. Writing just after the 2015 elections, the 
author, who identifies himself as Harrison Jani, accuses Mumba of straying from his 
divine calling: 
“Nevers,” he writes,  
… What big voice are you waiting for to convince you that you are in a 
wrong camp, arena or ring? Are you truly convinced that God created you to 
 12 
rule Zambia? I was a faithful follower of your inspiring sermons when you 
were still presenting Zambia Shall Be Saved. In one of your inspiring 
messages, you declared that you were above politics and that becoming a 
president would amount to a demotion for you. I agree with you 100 per cent 
because in the Bible, kings were subordinate to prophets and priests…8 
At one point in the letter, Jani compares Mumba to the disobedient prophet Jonah, whose 
refusal to go where God sent him nearly resulted in the destruction of the ship on which 
he had stowed away. Likewise, according to Jani Mumba’s disobedience was the cause of 
the problems in the MMD; Mumba had busied himself with politics when he should have 
been “organising Christian crusades in all provinces of Zambia, Africa, and overseas.”  
 
Jani’s open letter to Nevers Mumba is by no means a unique response to the latter’s 
political involvement. Many Pentecostals in Zambia, including the some of my 
informants on the Copperbelt, feel that by getting into politics Mumba has suffered a 
“demotion.” As Jani’s letter indicates, this term is not one they have simply pulled from 
midair. In the early 1990s, in what was apparently a widely viewed interview on ZNBC 
(then the only television station to which most Zambians had access), Mumba responded 
to the question of whether he would ever consider a career in politics with the statement 
that such a switch would be a “demotion,” a move to a lesser calling than the one he 
enjoyed as a Christian evangelist. Mumba later came to regard this position as an 
incorrect understanding of his vocation, but the idea has stuck in the minds of many 
Pentecostals, who regularly assert that in entering politics Mumba has walked away from 
his true calling. To take an example from my own fieldwork, Bana Blessing9, a believer 
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who frequented Pentecostal meetings across Nsofu, once told me that she felt that by 
entering state politics Nevers Mumba had left God’s work to collude with the devil. This 
conclusion is not quite as damning as it sounds, though it is nevertheless a strong 
indictment. In the dualistic framework that characterizes Pentecostal theology, especially 
in Africa (e.g. Haustein 2011, van Klinken 2013, 526-528), most anything that is not 
obviously embedded in Pentecostal practice is described in terms of the occult. I have 
been told by believers on the Copperbelt, for instance, that Hindus are Satanists. A 
similar logic informs a story related to me by Bana Sam, which she said had circulated in 
Pentecostal communities in the years after Nevers Mumba first got into politics. In this 
tale the devil was searching for a way to bring down the powerful preacher, temping him 
with women and money, both of which he refused. The devil then presented him with the 
possibility of political power, and this was the one thing he could not resist. In these 
diabolizing descriptions, the Pentecostal view reflects the language of “demotion” by 
eliding the secular and the satanic. 
 
In response to popular Pentecostal opinion, Mumba has devoted a significant amount of 
his media presence to addressing the question of why he left ministry to become a 
politician. Representative here is a series of pieces entitled “Answers from Nevers 
Mumba,” published on the MMD website in September of 2014, just weeks before the 
death of the president and the ill-fated elections that followed. In these pieces, Mumba 
responded to questions that had been posted on the party’s Facebook page, including: 
“Why did you abandon the church? Politics is dirty and not for you. Was it God who 
called you into politics?” In reply, Mumba wrote: 
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I am first a Christian, then a pastor and a politician. I did not substitute my 
Christian faith for politics. I just accepted an additional responsibility to 
public service – Politics. The same God who called me to be a minister of the 
Gospel, called me to influence politics by participation… My life’s 
commitment is to do God’s will. A moral and just Zambia is God’s will and 
defines my assignment in government… There is nowhere in the Bible where 
it says that a religious leader cannot serve as a community or political leader. 
To the contrary, the Bible suggests that believers in God holding political 
office can bring prosperity and justice to nations. Scripture says in Proverbs 
29:2 that ‘When the righteous rule, people rejoice, and when the 
unrighteousness [sic] rule, people mourn.10 
Mumba has included further evidence that he is still a pastor on his party’s website in the 
form of videos of him preaching and statements that he has retained his position as 
overseer of Victory Ministries, the network of churches he founded.  
 
In the nearly twenty years that Nevers Mumba has been involved in Zambian national 
politics, the dialogue represented in Jani’s open letter and Mumba’s “Answers” piece has 
been rehearsed countless times. What is notable about these exchanges is their lack of 
variation. Time and again Zambians have asked why Mumba has ceased to be a pastor 
and become a politician. Time and again Mumba has responded that he has never stopped 
being a pastor, and that his calling to politics is completely compatible with his calling to 
the pastorate. In the remainder of this article, I will tease out the reasons for this impasse. 
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The first step in this analysis is to identify exactly what Pentecostal believers expect of 
those who, like Nevers Mumba, call themselves pastors.  
 
Mediation, Morality, and the Pentecostal Pastorate 
 
Of the three small Pentecostal congregations that I followed during my doctoral 
fieldwork, the one I most enjoyed visiting was Freedom Bible Church. This congregation 
was growing by leaps and bounds when I first arrived in the field, often spilling out the 
door of the primary school classroom that they rented for worship each Sunday morning. 
The leader of the church was a dynamic preacher named Pastor Ephraim, who was 
known throughout Nsofu as a gifted prophet. One Monday morning in March 2008, when 
I had been in the township for nearly a month, I called on a member of Freedom Bible 
Church named Bana Buleti, a single mother who was living with her young son in the 
home of her older brother and sister-in-law. We had arranged ahead of time to travel 
together to Pastor Ephraim’s home, where that morning he was scheduled to be available 
for “deliverance,” the term that Pentecostals use for exorcism. As it turned out, Bana 
Buleti felt unable to leave the house (there had recently been a spate of robberies in 
Nsofu, as she was worried about the television), but she invited me in nonetheless. 
Grateful for an opportunity to visit with a new Pentecostal convert, I settled into her 
brother’s comfortable sitting room while Bana Buleti prepared fish for our lunch. Bana 
Buleti’s favorite topic of conversation was Pastor Ephraim, who, although he was very 
young, she explained, had a special favor from God upon his life. When Pastor Ephraim 
“stood in the gap” for someone, she proclaimed, using the metaphor that Pentecostals 
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employ for intercessory prayer, God would certainly hear and answer. Bana Buleti’s 
opinion of Pastor Ephraim was in no way unique. The dozens of people who flocked to 
Freedom Bible Church each Sunday were there largely because they believed that the 
pastor was a divinely favored figure whose prayers were very likely to be answered.  
 
As 2008 went on things at Freedom Bible Church remained largely unchanged, until one 
Sunday, about a year into my fieldwork, I arrived at the classroom where Freedom 
members met for worship to find that Pastor Ephraim was not in attendance. Rumors 
about his absence flew through the congregation, and it was not difficult to find out that 
the elders and junior pastors had asked Pastor Ephraim to step down temporarily after 
two women had come forward, both claiming to be pregnant by him. During his 
suspension Pastor Ephraim was barred not only from the pulpit, but also from performing 
the personalized religious services that were the key to his popularity – prophecy, prayer, 
and deliverance.  
 
Members of Freedom Bible Church responded in a variety of ways to the scandal. Some 
in the congregation believed Pastor Ephraim’s claims that the charges against him were 
false, and swore to me and to one another that they would not abandon him or their 
Pentecostal faith simply because of some slanderous accusations. Others acknowledged 
that it was very possible that Pastor Ephraim – a young, unmarried man who regularly 
prayed for single women in private – might have succumbed to temptation. While they 
agreed that this amounted to a moral failing on the part of their pastor, they also believed 
that Pastor Ephraim’s behavior was excusable, as he was only human (muntu). Indeed, 
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some of these believers laid the ultimate responsibility for Pastor Ephraim’s fall on the 
devil, who was clearly trying to use the situation to destroy Freedom Bible Church. More 
than one person responded to my questions about the scandal by quoting from the biblical 
prophet Zechariah: “Strike the shepherd, and the sheep will be scattered”11 – a verse that 
Jesus also quotes in the New Testament to predict that his disciples would run away when 
he was arrested.12 The idea that the devil had decided to target this particular “shepherd” 
in an attempt to scatter his “sheep” was proof of the former’s spiritual power, as it is 
common knowledge among Pentecostals that Satan only goes after those who are causing 
him trouble. Both those believers who denied the accusations against Pastor Ephraim and 
those who were willing to excuse them were determined to stand by their leader, 
confident that the trouble would soon blow over and he would return to ministry. 
 
In addition to those who remained in the church during the scandal, there were a number 
of others who left the congregation during this period. Some broke their ties with 
Freedom Bible Church because they felt they could not follow a pastor who did not live 
by Christian ethical standards. However, at least as far as I knew, the majority of those 
who left the church in the wake of the scandal did so not because of the accusations 
against Pastor Ephraim, but rather because they were no longer able to access his skills as 
a religious mediator. In Pastor Ephraim’s absence, junior pastors filled in as preachers 
and offered prayers on behalf of those who requested them. However, they were simply 
not as gifted as Pastor Ephraim, and in time the crowds dwindled, while those who 
continued to come on Sunday mornings nodded off during the sermons. Eventually, 
church leaders decided to reinstate Pastor Ephraim, although the issues that had led to his 
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suspension were never to my knowledge resolved. It seemed that the elders felt the 
church could not afford to lose any more members, and that the best way to prevent this 
happening was to restore to his original position the man who was clearly the church’s 
main attraction.  
 
There are two important points to take away from the example of Pastor Ephraim and the 
scandal that temporarily removed him from the pulpit. First, the main thing that believers 
are looking for when they attach themselves to a pastor is his capacity to act as a religious 
mediator. Pastors attract a following on the basis of their perceived closeness to God – 
the “favor” that Bana Buleti mentioned – and this favor is understood to facilitate their 
capacity as intercessors, as well as prophets and exorcists (see Haynes 2013, 2017).  
In addition to the strong emphasis that Copperbelt believers place on mediation, the 
second thing to note about the example of Pastor Ephraim is that, while many believers 
acknowledged their leader’s moral shortcomings, they did not regard these failings as an 
indication that he had lost his favored position in the eyes of God. I have written 
elsewhere about another Nsofu pastor, a Congolese man who was caught in a scandal not 
unlike the one in which Pastor Ephraim found himself embroiled, and was reported to the 
local authorities on accusations of hucksterism (see Haynes 2013, 89). The woman who 
described this situation to me said that she had first suspected that something was amiss 
when the mediatory work the pastor had performed on her behalf failed to produce 
results. If we can assume that other members of this ill-fated fellowship had similar 
experiences, then we can argue on this basis that what made believers angry in this case 
was first and foremost a failure of mediation, which was only after the fact connected to a 
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moral failure. Taken together, this example and that of Pastor Ephraim suggest that, while 
there are certainly believers who will break a relationship with a pastor over a perceived 
lack of virtue, there are many others who are less concerned with whether their pastor is 
acting ethically than they are with his capacity to serve as a religious intermediary, 
standing “in the gap” between them and God. Keeping this in mind, we can now turn our 
attention to how believers’ expectations of their pastors shape their understanding of 
leadership in a Christian nation. 
 
Two Pentecostal Political Paradigms: Leadership and Covenant 
 
The Pentecostal theologian Nimi Wariboko (2012) has identified five Pentecostal 
paradigms of national economic prosperity, two of which, the “leadership paradigm” and 
the “covenant paradigm,” are helpful for our purposes in this article. The key to 
prosperity in the leadership paradigm is, as the name suggests, the character of the person 
in charge. In this moralizing framework, the blame for national poverty falls on leaders 
who are more interested in their own enrichment than they are in the betterment of others. 
The key to national prosperity is therefore for “morally upright Christians to access 
legitimate power and authority” through “the election of Christian believers into public 
offices” (Wariboko 2012, 48). Christian elected officials will operate with “integrity,” a 
key word in this discourse, stemming the tide of political corruption through a process of 




Wariboko’s description of the leadership paradigm offers Nevers Mumba as a specific 
example of this approach (Wariboko 2012, 49). It is not difficult to see why. Since the 
beginning of his political career, Mumba’s platform has emphasized the need for better 
leadership, and more specifically for leadership that is informed by Christian values. For 
a long time after the 2015 election, the MMD official homepage included a prominent 
banner featuring a statement that Mumba first made at the founding of the NCC: “The 
equitable delivery of goods and services to any people depends on the morality and 
integrity of its leaders.” Seen from this angle, the perennial question of why Mumba 
would leave the pastorate to become a politician misses the point entirely. As Mumba 
argued in his “Answers” piece, not only is it possible for someone to be both a pastor and 
a politician at the same time, his track record in the first of these roles uniquely qualifies 
him for success in the second. If what is needed to bring about prosperity in Zambia is 
elected officials who have moral integrity, who better to take up the mantle of leadership 
than a pastor?  
 
Mumba is not the only member of the Zambian Pentecostal community who supports the 
leadership paradigm. Pastor Mwanza, whose family hosted me during my fieldwork, 
regularly bemoaned the widespread support that people on the Copperbelt gave to the late 
President Sata when he was running for office in 2008. He felt that citizens of a Christian 
nation ought to know better than to vote for someone who failed to measure up to 
Christian ethical standards (among other things, Sata was a known smoker and 
womanizer). Pastor Mwanza believed that only politicians of integrity could really 
change the nation. While this example demonstrates that there are some Zambian 
 21 
believers who share Mumba’s commitment to the leadership paradigm, it is obvious from 
his election results that the same cannot be said of all Pentecostals. As we have seen, 
when it comes to the pastorate, most believers are less concerned with the morality of 
their leaders than they are with their capacity to act as religious mediators. This brings us 
to the second paradigm identified by Wariboko, which he calls the “covenant paradigm.”  
 
The covenant paradigm is informed by biblical texts that carry an explicit contractual 
structure, for example 1 Chronicles 7:14 in which God promises, “If my people who are 
called by my name will humble themselves, and pray and seek my face, and turn from 
their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin and heal their 
land” (emphasis added). This text is particularly relevant to the Zambian case, as it was 
included in President Chiluba’s initial declaration that Zambia was a Christian nation in 
1991. During his television broadcast Chiluba cited this well-known verse as “proof that 
a nation is blessed, whenever it enters into a covenant with God” (qtd. in Gifford 1998, 
367). He then led the country in a prayer of repentance before proclaiming:  
On behalf of the nation, I have now entered into a covenant with the living 
God… I submit the Government and the entire nation of Zambia to the 
Lordship of Jesus Christ. I further declare that Zambia is a Christian Nation 
that will seek to be governed by the righteous principles of the word of God. 
Righteousness and justice must prevail at all levels of authority, and then we 
shall see the righteousness of God exalting Zambia (qtd. in Gifford 1998, 
367-368). 
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As Chiluba’s words make clear, the declaration was originally laid out in terms of the 
covenant paradigm, pre-emptively offering the country to God with the understanding 
that this would result in him “exalting Zambia.” As I have shown in greater detail 
elsewhere (Haynes 2015), this how most Pentecostals still understand what it means for 
their country to be a Christian nation. In their eyes, Zambia is “God’s nation,” as the 
country has entered into an agreement with God that, among other things, protects them 
from war and carries the promise of national prosperity (also see Haynes 2012, 129-131).  
 
The covenantal structure of the declaration has implications for national leadership. 
Chiluba’s statement that he had entered into a divine covenant “on behalf of the nation” 
cast him in a priestly role, as he stood in the place of Zambia and mediated between the 
Zambian people and God (Hubert and Mauss 1964, 23). In this sacerdotal paradigm, the 
most important qualification for the presidency is the capacity for religious mediation. 
Understood in these terms, it is clear that Zambian Pentecostals are not at all opposed to 
having a pastor as their president – indeed, we can assume that they would prefer an 
arrangement along these lines. Good pastors are good mediators, after all, and a good 
pastor would therefore also make a good president, one who is well equipped to “stand in 
the gap” and uphold the covenant established with the declaration. Chiluba certainly 
worked hard to emphasize his pastoral qualities, most notably by preaching at 
evangelistic crusades (Gifford 1998, 370), thereby blurring the boundary between 
religious and state leadership and effectively turning Zambia into a hierocracy.  
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In contrast, when Mumba describes himself as a pastor he does not refer to his capacities 
as a mediator, but rather to this role’s guarantee of Christian ethical standards. In the light 
of what we have learned from the example of Pastor Ephraim, it is no surprise that 
Mumba’s interpretation of the pastorate as marker of integrity has failed to translate into 
votes. As we have seen, most Pentecostals are not terribly compelled by the language of 
morality; to put it bluntly, what they want in a pastor is not so much good morals as good 
mediation. On this point the example of Chiluba continues to be instructive. While the 
Chiluba government was arguably the most corrupt that Zambia has ever seen, 
Pentecostals do not generally include this fact in their accounts of his time in office. 
Among believers in Nsofu at least, Chiluba is remembered primarily as the man who 
brought Zambia into a covenant with God, and for that reason Pentecostal history has 
been kind to him.  
 
Here, then, is the rub of the unending debate between Nevers Mumba and Zambia’s 
Pentecostals. As we have seen, Mumba’s repeated claims to pastoral authority have 
largely gone unrecognized. This is because Mumba does not present himself as a 
religious mediator, which means that, as believers have told him again and again, he has 
stopped being a pastor. No amount of insisting on Mumba’s part has been able to 
convince them otherwise. The reason that the majority of Zambia’s Pentecostals don’t 
support Mumba is therefore not because they regard the pastorate as a lesser calling than 
the presidency, but rather because they want a president who they can identify as a pastor 
because he is an effective mediator. If their voting record is any indication, it appears that 
they do not find Mumba adequately suited to this task. 
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Conclusion: New Directions in Pentecostal Populism 
 
In September of 2014 I met with Nevers Mumba in his Lusaka home to discuss the 
possibility of making a documentary film about his political career. While this was not a 
formal interview, Mumba made a remark as I was leaving that has been key to the 
foregoing analysis. In pondering why so many Pentecostals did not support him, Mumba 
wondered out loud if this had something to do with the fact that he was a church leader. 
Believers seemed fine with voting for other Christians and even other Pentecostals, he 
mused, so by itself his religious affiliation did not appear to be the issue. Perhaps the 
problem was therefore that he was not an ordinary believer, but rather a pastor. Upon 
reflection, I’ve come to the conclusion that Mumba’s hunch was right, though not for 
reasons that I imagine he would anticipate. The problem, as we have seen, is not that he is 
a pastor involved in politics, but rather that since entering politics he has not presented 
himself as a capable religious mediator. At issue, then, is not the fact that Mumba is a 
pastor, but rather the fact that in the eyes of most believers he is not a good pastor, 
someone capable of mediating the covenant made in the declaration.  
 
In conclusion, I would like to briefly explore what the example of Nevers Mumba tells us 
about Pentecostal politics. In countries like Zambia, where believers make up a 
significant portion of the population, it comes as no surprise that Pentecostalism is 
increasingly shaping the national political scene. In Kenya, Pentecostal language has 
been central to discourses of national repentance and forgiveness after the post-election 
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violence of 2007 (Deacon 2015). In Ghana, Pentecostalism has been identified as a site 
for new forms of patronage and big man rule, reflective of shifting values and a 
weakening state (McCauley 2013). Patronage is also a factor in the Zambian case, though 
rather than mediate access to larger networks of wealth and influence in the manner of 
traditional patrons (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980), political leaders are increasingly being 
asked to mediate divine favor. This, in turn, suggests that Pentecostalism is changing the 
face of populism, focusing political discourse on leaders’ capacity to serve as religious 
intermediaries.  
 
Previous discussions of an emerging Pentecostal populism in Zambia have portrayed the 
declaration as a blatant bid for believers’ votes. In other words, by declaring Zambia a 
Christian nation Chiluba was simply “making use of Christianity for the legitimacy it can 
confer… almost coopting Christianity” for his own political ends (Gifford 1998, 370). In 
contrast, I have shown in this article that the declaration, both as it was originally made 
and as it has subsequently been articulated, represents a form of popular politics that 
overlaps considerably with popular religion. This is because, for Pentecostals, religious 
actions like the declaration are political actions as well. Pentecostal political theology 
situates state power in a larger contest between divine and diabolical forces (Meyer 
2010), which means that religious actions like the declaration have political significance 
not so much because they attract votes, but rather because they intervene at the highest 
levels of supernatural power (Kalu 2008). All of this means that, in contrast to arguments 
that have questioned the influence of Pentecostalism in Zambian public life (Cheyeka et 
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al. 2014), the declaration has fundamentally altered the political landscape of the country, 
reconfiguring populism in terms of religious mediation. 
 
The ongoing influence of this particular form of Pentecostal populism in Zambia was 
made very clear in October of 2015, when President Edgar Lungu called a national day of 
prayer and fasting to address his country’s economic crisis. On the designated Sunday 
Lungu himself presided over a gathering at the Lusaka showgrounds, kneeling in prayer, 
thumbing through a leather-bound Bible, and at one point releasing a dove into the 
crowd, a symbol of the Holy Spirit. “I wish to thank the Almighty God for allowing us to 
assemble and observe the day of repentance, reconciliation, prayer and fasting,” Lungu 
said, addressing the crowd. “I personally believe,” he went on, “that since we humbled 
ourselves as a people and have sincerely cried out to the God of Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob; he has heard our cry, has forgiven out sins and will surely heal our land.”13 
Lungu’s words are a clear reference to the covenantal text that Chiluba used in the 
original declaration, and by describing the day of prayer and fasting in these terms he 
presented himself as a leader capable of interceding on the nation’s behalf and renewing 
the covenant between Zambia and God. In the eyes of many Zambians these efforts were 
successful. On the day of prayer a strange rainbow-colored ring was visible around the 
sun, and this was taken as an indication that God was pleased with the event.14 The fact 
that the sign was a rainbow serves to further position the day of prayer in the covenant 
framework, as in the book of Genesis the rainbow is given as a sign of God’s covenant 
with Noah.  
 
 27 
When it was first announced, not everyone supported Lungu’s day of prayer and fasting, 
and opposition leaders worked hard to discredit the event before it happened.15 In the 
light of the above analysis, it is not difficult to see why these efforts were unsuccessful, 
and at the last minute even Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of Zambia’s main opposition 
party the UPND, abandoned his criticisms and went to church.16 When it comes to 
popular opinion in Zambia, rejecting a call to “humble [oneself] and pray” is a political 
nonstarter, and even those who are critical of Lungu’s PF government must support 
efforts to keep God on the side of the nation. Clearly, Pentecostalism has had a profound 
effect on Zambian politics, and there is no sign that its impact will diminish in the 
coming years. As a result, populism in this self-proclaimed Christian nation will 
increasingly require leaders to intercede on Zambia’s behalf. As time goes on it is 
therefore likely that Zambians will require a pastor – a good pastor, rather than a pastor 
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1 Included here are the three groups that Johnson and Zurlo (2014) categorizes as 
‘Renewalists’ – that is (to use the technical language here), classical Pentecostals, 
charismatics (i.e. members of mainline denominations who engage in Pentecostal 
practices), and neo-Pentecostals.  
2 The name of this township, as well as all other names of individual informants and 
congregations are pseudonyms. 
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3 Though, following my informants’ usage, I employ the more general term “Pentecostal” 
to refer to the people that I also call “believers” 
4 Information on Mumba’s biography comes from his short book, Integrity with Fire 
(Mumba 1994); a book written by his friend and bible school classmate Kirby Lockhart 
(Zambia Shall be Saved: The Nevers Mumba Story (Lockhart 2001)); and a recent article 
by Austin Cheyeka (2014). 
5 Indeed, at the press conference where Mumba introduced the NCC he said he would 
target “the moral majority of our population” (qtd. in Lockhart 2001: 80). 
6 See: “Zambian judge blocks election results” 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1736841.stm) 
7 Apparently, Mumba had suggested that some opposition candidates were receiving 





9 The Bemba-language feminine prefix “Bana” is used on the Copperbelt both as an 
equivalent of “Mrs.” and, as in this case, to denote a teknonym. 
10 http://mmdzambia.org/miscellaneous/2014/09/22/answers-from-nevers-mumba-part-
one/.  
11 Zechariah 13: 7 
12 The analogy here is obvious and serves as a further index of the mediatory capacity of 
church leaders, as Christian theology highlights Jesus’ role as a mediator. 
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